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Use of Drug Detecting Dogs in Public High Schools
The use of trained dogs to detect marijuana1 among public high school
students and in their lockers raises a threat to a student's fourth
amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Doe
v. Renfrow2 and Jones v. Latexo Independent School District' are the
only cases to have dealt with the use of trained dogs in a high school.
Doe held that the use of dogs in a public school was constitutional, find-
ing that the dog inspection was not a search under the fourth amend-
ment but was a justified regulatory action taken in accordance with the
school's duty to preserve a disciplined and productive school environ-
ment.4 The court in Jones held, contrary to Doe, that the indiscriminate
use of marijuana sniffing dogs was unconstitutional.'
In deciding on the constitutionality of dog searches in schools, these
courts were faced with the task of aligning two developing issues: the
use of trained dogs by police officers and student searches conducted by
school administrators. Prior decisions addressing the use of drug detect-
ing dogs have generally held that the use of the canines does not con-
stitute a search for purposes of the fourth amendment.' Nevertheless,
these courts have required a minimal amount of prior suspicion to be
' Dogs of various breeds have been trained to detect odors of certain drugs, primarily
marijuana and heroin. In searching for hidden drugs, a dog handler leads his dog around the
suspected area. If the dog senses the presence of drugs, it gives a signal. Such an indication
of the presence of a marijuana or heroin odor is called an "alert" or a "reaction" and usually
consists of snarling, barking, whining or pawing at the area of the scent. For a general ex-
planation of the training a dog receives, see Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the
Government's Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?,
13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 410, 414-18 (1976).
For articles dealing with dog searches in public schools, see Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs
in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope, Nw. U.L. REv. 803 (1979);
Note, The Constitutionality of Canine Searches in the Classroom, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 39 (1980); Comment, Search and Seizure in Public Schools: Are Our Children's
Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 119 (1979).
' 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979). The plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976). They sought damages for violation of their constitutional rights
as guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments resulting from the dog
search. They also sought a permanent injunction against future dog searches.
' 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980). That case involved an indiscriminate search of indi-
vidual students and automobiles parked in the school lot.
475 F. Supp. at 1019.
499 F. Supp. at 237.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); United States v. Painter, 480 F. Supp. 282 (W.D. Mo. 1979);
cf. United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (dog search allowed only upon a
showing of probable cause), rev'd, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
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shown before the use of dogs can be validated.' Decisions dealing with
conventional student searches conducted by school officials have upheld
the searches on a showing of "reasonable suspicion" '--a standard
similar to the one required in the dog search cases and much less string-
ent than the probable cause standard police officers must satisfy before
conducting a search.9
The court in Doe chose to follow these precedents and applied the
lower "reasonable suspicion" standard. It failed to recognize that the
use of dogs in a public school resembles neither the prior dog cases nor
the prior school cases. This note will propose that a dog inspection in a
public school creates a special situation which demands a re-evaluation
of the rationale used by courts applying the lesser standard. It will
argue that the use of dogs constitutes a search and that students sub-
jected to this search are entitled to the protection of the fourth amend-
ment and will conclude that the utilization of the dogs by school officials
should be permitted only upon satisfying the strict probable cause stan-
dard."°
THE DOG SEARCH
Doe v. Renfrow was the first case to deal with the use of dogs in a
public school and provides a reasonable example of how dogs are likely
to be used in future school searches. Trained marijuana detecting dogs
were utilized by school officials in an effort to combat serious drug
' See United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1004 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); United States v.
Painter, 480 F. Supp. 282, 284 (W.D. Mo. 1979). See also People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d
346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975) (dog search invalidated in part because the dogs were utilized
without any knowledge of possible presence of drugs).
' See, e.g., M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham C.U.S.D. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill.
1977); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d
75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977). But see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S.
809 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976) (warrant based on probable cause required
before school teacher can search student's wallet).
The amount of proof needed to satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement is unclear.
The Supreme Court has stated that the requirement is generally satisfied if the searching
party has a reasonable belief "that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968); see notes 70-78 & accompanying text infra.
' See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
"o This note will consider only the dog search in a public junior or senior high school that
is conducted primarily by school officials for school administrative and disciplinary pur-
poses.-If the use of dogs is only allowed in schools upon a showing by the school officials of
probable cause, the use of dogs will be unnecessary in most cases. However, the dogs may
be used to a limited extent in some situations. For example, school officials or police officers
may have probable cause to believe that the school is being used as a storage place for a
large amount of marijuana. In such a situation, the dogs may aid the police in searching
nonpersonal areas of the school, just as they could aid the police in searching a warehouse.
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abuse problems in the school. The search was intended to rid the junior
and senior high schools of illicit drugs and discourage their future use."
Although several police officers were involved, the police had previous-
ly agreed that no criminal charges would be brought against any of the
students found in possession of drugs; 2 nevertheless, school admin-
istrators intended to bring school disciplinary proceedings against any
student violator.13
During the search, a canine team 4 visited each classroom. 5 The
students were instructed to sit quietly in their seats with their hands
and any purses or other belongings placed upon their desks while the
dogs were led up and down the aisles of the classroom. 6 The dogs
"alerted"'7 to particular students on approximately fifty occasions. 8
After each alert the student was required to empty his pockets or her
purse; 9 if no marijuana was found as a result of this procedure, the stu-
dent was subjected to a body search.2" As a result of the inspection sev-
enteen students were found in possession of marijuana and two were
found in possession of drug paraphernalia.2'
" 475 F. Supp. at 1016.
" Id. Although the court often refers to police officers in the Jones opinion, it does not
appear that the police department was involved in that search. See 499 F. Supp. at 228-29.
'3 475 F. Supp. at 1016.
" Each canine team consisted of a school administrator or teacher, a trained dog and its
handler and a uniformed police officer. There were six canine teams working at one time.
Id.
d' Id. It does not appear from the opinion that the dogs were used to detect marijuana in
student lockers. However, lockers were included in other searches conducted with dogs in
the northeastern part of Indiana. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Temporary and Preliminary Injunctive Relief at 6-9, Doe v. Renfrow, 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.
Tex. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Memorandum].
"1 475 F. Supp. at 1016. The search in Doe began during the first period class. Each
teacher was instructed, by means of a sealed note, to keep students in class throughout the
duration of the search. The inspection lasted two and a half hours. Any student wishing to
use the washroom was allowed to leave the classroom with an escort to the washroom door.
Id. at 1016-17.
The plaintiff in Doe alleged that she and her classmates were illegally detained in their
classrooms due to the extended first period class. The court rejected this argument, noting
that similarly extended periods had been experienced at other times during convocations
and school assemblies. Id. at 1019.
' See note 1 supra.
475 F. Supp. at 1017.
Id.
The court stated that a body search "involved extensive examination of the student's
clothing entailing the removal of some of the garments." Id. at 1017 n,6. The dog continued
to alert to the plaintiff, Doe, after she was subjected to the body search. Finding nothing on
her person, the officials escorted her to the nurse's station where she was required to strip
in the presence of two women, one of whom was a friend of the plaintiff's mother. Her hair
and clothes were examined and no marijuana or other drugs were found. It was later
discovered that the plaintiff played with a dog in heat on the morning of the search and the
trained dog was reacting to that scent. Id. at 1017.
21 Of those 17 students found possessing drugs, 12 withdrew from school voluntarily and
three were expelled. The two found possessing paraphernalia were both suspended. Id. In
Jones, six students were suspended for possession of paraphernalia. 449 F. Supp. at 229.
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE USE OF DOGS IN SEARCHES
The validity of a dog search as described in Doe is governed by the
fourth amendment, which protects "[t]he rights of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures."22 The case law interpreting this amendment
has held it to mean only that unreasonable searches, rather than all
searches, are invalid.' Generally two questions must be asked in deter-
mining whether an illegal search has been conducted: first, whether a
search and seizure has actually taken place;24 and second, whether the
search was reasonable.25
Katz v. United States" is the leading Supreme Court case for deter-
mining whether a search has actually been conducted. In Katz, FBI
agents attached an electronic listening and recording device to the out-
side of a telphone booth from which incriminating calls were being made
by the defendant.27 The Supreme Court held that the evidence obtained
as a result of the electronic device was inadmissible at trial and that the
use of such devices was unconstitutional.28 This holding significantly
altered prior search and seizure law because it explicitly rejected the
long standing "trespass doctrine" of Olmstead v. United States.' That
doctrine required a physical penetration into a person's property before
fourth amendment protections could be applied." In Katz, the Supreme
n U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Courts have not been consistent in protecting minor students'
fourth amendment rights. Compare In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972),
and In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969), and Mercer v. State, 450
S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), with Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976),
and State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975). The Supreme Court has suggested
that fourth amendment rights should be extended to minors as well as adults. See Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students held to be entitled to first amend-
ment rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1968) (minor held to be entitled to protections of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in delinquency adjudication proceedings).
These two cases imply that minor students enjoy the same constitutional status as adults.
The Court in Gault noted that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone." Id. at 13. See also Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of
Students in Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REv. 739, 739-43 (1974).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
24 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d
1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
' See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d
Cir. 1974); People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977); State v. Elkins, 47
Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976).
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 359.
" 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
" Id. at 457. Olmstead also involved the use of wiretaps on the defendant's telephone. Id.
at 456-57. As in Katz, there was no intrusion upon the defendant's premises. In Olmstead,
the use of the wiretaps had been upheld. Id. at 466. See also Goodman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942) (evidence obtained by use of a detectaphone applied to the wall of a room ad-joining the office of the defendant held to have been legally obtained).
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Court shifted its emphasis from protecting property interests to pro-
tecting privacy interests," noting that the "Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places."32
The majority opinion in Katz did not specify what privacy interests
are protected under the fourth amendment, but courts which have
decided subsequent search and seizure cases have followed the test for-
mulated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion2 Justice Harlan
believed that the limitations of the fourth amendment apply in those cir-
cumstances in which a person harbors a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 4
Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy test was invoked
in a situation involving the use of trained drug detecting dogs for the
first time in United States v. Bronstein,35 a case where narcotic agents
used two trained dogs to examine the defendants' luggage at an airport
terminal. The dogs' reactions were positive36 and after opening the lug-
gage the agents discovered 240 pounds of marijuana." The Second Cir-
I, The Supreme Court refrained from equating the fourth amendment rights with a
general constitutional "right to privacy." The Court noted that the amendment's "protec-
tions go further [than the privacy of persons] and often have nothing to do with privacy at
all." 389 U.S. at 350.
Id. at 351.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). See also United States v. Diggs, 569 F.2d
1264 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1977).
1, The test consists of a two-fold requirement: "[Flirst that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). An il-
lustration used by Justice Harlan in Katz helps explain his "expectation of privacy" test.
He reasoned that one who occupies a telephone booth, shuts the door and pays the toll to
make a call has a reasonable expectation that his private conversation is not being in-
tercepted. In contrast, Harlan believed that "conversation in the open would not be pro-
tected against being overheard, because any expectation of privacy under these cir-
cumstances would be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that in some situations the first prong of the Katz test
dealing with subjective expectations "would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The first prong was eventually
refuted by Justice Harlan himself. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). A sub-
jective expectation of privacy does not add to an individual's claim to fourth amendment
protection. If it did, the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of
privacy "merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a
decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
384 (1§74).
Therefore, the second prong of Katz is the modern basis for deciding whether certain
searches require fourth amendment protection. See, e.g., Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825
(3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). Although the expectation of privacy test has not been address-
ed in detail by the Supreme Court since Katz, it has been referred to in several cases. See,
e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
335 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
A positive reaction means that the dog has picked up the scent of the substance being
sought. See note 1 supra.
5 21 F.2d at 461.
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cuit Court of Appeals held that the use of dogs was an intrusion upon
the defendants' privacy, but that the .fourth amendment did not apply
because they did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
airplane luggage. 8
A different approach was taken by the Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Venema 9 There, trained dogs were used to detect marijuana
suspected to have been placed inside lockers at a storage company.
The court held that the fourth amendment was not applicable because
the defendant did not have "any justifiable expectation of privacy in the
areaway [in front of the defendant's locker] in the storage building."41
The court claimed that since the dog only sniffed the air in the areaway,
no search of the defendant's rented locker was conducted.42
Expectations of Privacy
These cases illustrate two lines of analysis used in dog search cases.
The first involves the expectation of privacy test and is typified by the
Bronstein case; it should be limited to airport searches which can be dis-
tinguished from school searches on the basis of the special dangers in-
volved in international and domestic travel." Courts have generally held
The rationale behind this holding is that passengers do not possess a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy while travelling on commercial airlines. "There can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy when one transports baggage by plane, particularly today when the
menace to public safety by the skyjacker and the passage of dangerous or hazardous freight
compels continuing scrutiny of passengers and their impedimenta." Id. at 462.
The court also intimated that the use of the dogs did not constitute a physical search.
Although some language seems to support such a proposition, the opinion in its totality
states that a search was conducted, but that it was reasonable considering the circum-
stances of the case. For a discussion of the cases which hold that the use of dogs does not
constitute a search, see notes 56-69 & accompanying text infra.
" 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
40 Id.
' Id. at 1006.
42 Id.
, Although the problem of airplane hijacking has been prevalent since 1930, it reached
its apex in the late 1960's. In 1968, 18 American airplanes were hijacked. In 1969, the figure
rose to 33. The number has declined every year since then. McGinley & Downs, Airport
Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 294-95 (1972).
The airlines are also hampered with severe detection problems. The court in United
States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973), described some of
the problems:
Airport security officials have the awesome responsibility of ferreting out hi-
jacking threats from among thousands of passengers while at the same time
avoiding any undue disruption .... [while] the hijacker prefers the anonymity
of the crowd .... His arsenal is not confined to the cumbersome gun or knife;
for modern technology has made it possible to miniaturize to such a degree
that enough plastic explosives to blow up an airplane can be concealed in a
toothpaste tube. A detonator planted in a fountain pen is all that is required to
set it off.
475 F.2d at 49.
[Vol. 56:321
DRUG DETECTING DOGS
that persons have a reduced expectation of privacy in their luggage as.
passengers on an airline," and that passengers consent to a baggage
search by accepting passage on the airplane45 or that an airport search
is justified under the stop-and-frisk approach.48 These holdings imply
that searches among airline passengers are not as strictly protected
under the fourth amendment as those in other contexts.47 As a result,
the ruling in Bronstein that the use of dogs is not a search should be
limited to airport cases and should not be reflected in other kinds of
cases involving the use of trained dogs.
The ever present danger of hijackings which reduces a passenger's
expectation of privacy in his luggage does not exist in the school envi-
ronment. Students clearly have a justifiable expectation of privacy in
their person."8 Although it is unclear whether they possess the same ex-
pectation in their school lockers,49 expectations of privacy are not
limited by the fact that students do not own or rent their lockers. The
applicability of the fourth amendment does not turn on the nature of the
property interest in the area searched." Similarly, the fact that the stu-
" See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1974). See also United
States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 465 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 918 (1976).
," See, e.g., United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Doran,
482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1085 (1972); cf. United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797, 803 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd,
464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (rejecting the consent argument because the defendant's consent
was neither voluntary nor intelligently given); People v. Erdman, 69 Misc. 2d 103, 329
N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (defendant's mere presence and silence at airport was too am-
biguous to constitute waiver of constitutional right).
" The stop-and-frisk approach stems from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For an ap-
plication of it in the context of airline searches, see, e.g., United States v. Clark, 498 F.2d
535 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840
(1973); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States
v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
" The implication seems to have been accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court
stated: "[LQuggage contents are not open to public view except as a condition to a border en-
try or common carrier traveL" United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (emphasis
added).
" See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-
Chathan C.U.S.D. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. I1. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214
(N.D. I1. 1976); People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); State v.
McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977).
"' See State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970).
The court labelled the legal status of the school locker as "somewhat anomalous" and held
that "[a]lthough a student may have control of his school locker as against fellow students,
his possession is not exclusive against the school and its officials." 203 Kan. at 640, 456 P.2d
at 3. See also People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
1 In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), a search of books and records was held to
be illegal although the materials were taken from an office shared by the defendant and
several other union officers. The Court stated that the fourth amendment "does not shield
only those who have title to the searched premises ... [and] to claim the protection of the
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the
area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
1981]
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dent does not maintain exclusive control over his locker does not in
itself justify the conclusion that the student lacks a justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy.' The significant question is whether the student places
personal effects inside the locker, manifesting an "expectation that the
contents [will] remain free from public examination."52 The school locker
is a depository for many personal effects of a student,' and when he
closes his locker he manifests an expectation that neither school officials
nor other students will examine the contents. The student, therefore,
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy. The argument is made
stronger by the nature of the school environment, in which the student's
personal freedom and privacy are structured and highly regulated.' In
such surroundings, placing personal effects in a locker is the only means
a student has to protect them from being viewed by others.
intrusion." Id. at 367-68. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); Gillard v.
Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir. 1978) (guidance counselor in a public high school pos-
sessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his school desk).
" See United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1977). This case held that a police
officer had a justifiable expectation of privacy in a locker that he used at department head-
quarters. The defendant knew that the police chief possessed a master key to all the
lockers. He did not own or rent the locker, but was assigned it by the department. This
situation seems perfectly analogous to the school locker situation. See also Gillard v.
Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). That case held that a guidance counselor in a public
high school possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk at school, even though
the school board members had access to all the offices with use of the janitor's keys. Cf.
State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970 (although
student's possession of his locker was exclusive as to other students, it was not exclusive as
to school officials).
' United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (warrantless search of footlocker
violates fourth amendment).
' Items a student might keep in a high school locker include "letters from a girl friend,
applications for a job, poetry he is writing, books that may be ridiculed because they are
too simple or too advanced, or dancing shoes he may be embarrassed to own." Buss, supra
note 22, at 773.
5 Id.
Id. The opinions holding that students have no privacy interests in their lockers argue
that the highly structured and regulated school life reduces the expectations of privacy of
students. See, e.g., People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 362-63, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598, 283
N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1967) (students were aware that the principal possessed combinations to all
lockers). Such an argument is based on the assumption that students give up all their
privacy rights when they enter the schoolhouse door. The assumption is fallacious, given
that students are required by law to attend school. Otherwise, students would be put in a
position in which they must choose between either giving up their privacy interests for
eight hours or breaking the law by not attending school.
School regulations and a record of past locker inspections that make it clear to the stu-
dent that the use of his locker is not exclusive and is subject to periodic inspection may
alter the student's expectation of privacy in his locker. See United States v. Bunkers, 521
F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975); Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997 (C.D.
Cal. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921
(E.D. Pa.), affd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 56:321
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Whether Dog Sniffing Constitutes a Search
The second line of analysis, followed in Venema," is that the use of
the dogs' olfactory process is not a physical search. According to the
reasoning of the court, the dog was not searching the defendant's rented
locker, but was merely examining the air outside the locker." This view
cannot be reconciled with previous cases which have held that the use of
magnetometers"8 and x-ray machines" constitutes a search under the
fourth amendment.' It is difficult to distinguish between the use of dogs
and the use of a magnetometer or x-ray; both are nonhuman means to
detect the contents of a closed area without physical entry. Judge
Mansfield, in his concurring opinion in Bronstein,"1 offered this compari-
son:
There is no legally significant difference between the use of an
x-ray machine or magnetometer to invade a closed area in order to
detect the presence of a metal pistol or knife, and the use of a dog to
sniff for marijuana inside a private bag.... The magnetometer ascer-
tains whether there is metal in the hidden space by detecting changes
in the magnetic fields surrounding the area of the hidden space. The
dog uses its extremely sensitive olfactory nerve to determine
whether there are marijuana molecules emanating from the hidden
space. 2
563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Quatsling, 24 Ariz.
App. 105, 536 P.2d 226 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 945 (1976).
563 F.2d at 1007-08.
See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States V. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1973). A magnetometer, used primarily at airports, is a device
that is activated solely by metal on the person of the passenger. It can be activated by a
mass approximating a .25 caliber pistol. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 802, 805.
U The x-ray devices, now in use at most major airports, are used to detect weapons in
carry-on baggage. See, e.g., People v. Fritschler, 81 Misc. 2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1975).
The same rationale behind the magnetometer cases has been used to uphold the use of
these devices.
'o These courts have held that the use of these machines is reasonable in light of the cir-
cumstances present in an airport. See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d
Cir. 1974): "The absolutely minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger's privacy weigh-
ed against the great threat to hundreds of persons if a hijacker is able to proceed to the
plane undetected is determinative of the reasonableness of the search."
" Judge Mansfield disagreed with the majority, holding that no search was conducted.
He believed that the agents' actions did constitute a search, but were reasonable consider-
ing the circumstances of the case. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 465 (2d Cir.
1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
" 521 F.2d at 464 (citations omitted). The majority opinion tried to distinguish the use of
magnetometers and dogs by pointing out that the use of drug detecting dogs is more selec-
tive in that they are trained to smell only the prohibited item such as marijuana; therefore,
only guilty persons are searched further. The majority claimed that the magnetometer may
be set off by the presence of such "innocuous objects as lockets, key chains, combs or
coins." Id. at 462 (majority opinion). Such an argument has some merit. See Note, Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM L. REV.
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The drug detecting dogs can be trained to such a high degree of ac-
curacy in detecting the scent of marijuana that, although they are living
creatures, they resemble "finely tuned machines," 3 indistinguishable in
substance from magnetometers, x-ray machines or bugging devices."
Judge Mansfield realized this and noted that the essence of any search
is the intrusion into a closed area otherwise insulated from human view
or smell. 5 The use of dogs to detect marijuana comes under this defini-
tion, just as does the use of magnetometers to detect metal, and there-
fore, should be considered a search and be subject to the limitations of
the fourth amendment.66
Therefore, despite the holdings of several courts, dog sniffing is a
search for purposes of fourth amendment analysis. Because students
maintain an expectation of privacy both as to their person and their
973, 986 (1976). The argument falls short, however, because it fails to consider the potential
for false alerts. A trained dog reacts only to the scent-not the presence-of marijuana.
Therefore, it is possible that the dog may alert to a lingering scent in an area from which
marijuana has been recently removed. See notes 138-41 & accompanying text infra. Thus, a
police officer who, on the basis of a dog's false alert, conducts an extensive search, invades
the privacy of a person who, although connected in some remote way to the use of mari-
juana, is innocent. Trained dogs are very accurate, however, and the frequency of false
alerts is minimal. See Savage, Drug Detector Dogs, ALL HANDS, August, 1973, at 47. Yet
the degree of accuracy is irrelevant to whether the use of dogs is a search; it is only rele-
vant in determining whether a search is reasonable in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances. See Judge Mansfield's approach to the problem in United States v. Bronstein,
521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
See also notes 58-60 & accompanying text supra.
Comment, supra note 1, at 416.
', For a discussion of the use of magnetometers and x-rays, see notes 58-59 & accompa-
nying text supra. For a case dealing with electronic bugging devices, see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5 United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
" Most dog search cases have not held that the use of dogs is subject to the protections
of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); State v. Martinez, 26 Ariz. App. 210, 547
P.2d 62 (1976); People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973); cf. People v.
Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977) (use of dogs reasonable search under
fourth amendment and thus probable cause not required); People v. Campbell, 67 fI. 2d 308,
367 N.E.2d 949 (1977) (same); State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976)
(same). But see United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (use of dogs
unreasonable search and thus violation of fourth amendment), rev'd, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir.
1976).
Virtually all the commentators take the view that the use of the dogs should be con-
sidered a search under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 2.2(f) (1978) (quoting the opinion of Judge Mansfield and arguing that the use of dogs
should be considered a search even though such searches may be allowed upon a showing of
less than probable cause); Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy:
Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV. 75 (1976); Note, The Detection of Mari-
juana by Trained Dogs, 2 U. DAYTON L. REV. 149 (1977); Note, supra note 62; Note, Police
Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 1167.
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lockers," an intrusion into those protected areas without a showing of
probable cause is unconstitutional. The dogs are indistinguishable in
function from magnetometers, x-ray machines or bugging devices."8 Use
of those devices has been repeatedly held to constitute a search for pur-
poses of the fourth amendment. To hold otherwise is contrary to and ir-
reconcilable with those cases, some of which were decided by the
Supreme Court. The use of dogs without a showing of probable cause
in a public school is an unwarranted intrusion into areas where students
maintain expectations of privacy. The use of dogs is therefore subject to
constitutional scrutiny and must meet the standard of reasonableness
mandated by the fourth amendment.
COMPETING STANDARDS IN TESTING REASONABLENESS
Even if the use of dogs is a search under the fourth amendment, it can
still be sustained if it is "reasonable. ' Under traditional search and
seizure doctr'ine, a search is reasonable if it is based on probable cause."
The standard for probable cause is met when known facts and circum-
stances are sufficient in themselves to lead a reasonably prudent person
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. 2 The prob-
able cause test is an objective one and is approached from the vantage
point of a reasonable police officer guided by his experience and train-
ing.73
Courts do not always require this strict criminal law standard of prob-
able cause to be met. There are several categories of situations in which
a lesser standard is applied.' Under this standard, the searching party
67 See notes 48-55 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 56-66 & accompanying text supra.
69 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See notes 22-25 & accompanying text supra.
7, See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); United States v. Davis,
458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
72 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
71 United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Burbank
v. Warden, Ill. State Penitentiary, 535 F.2d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Davis,
458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
,, The less strict standard has recently been used in deciding the validity of school
searches. See notes 79-103 & accompanying text infra. It has also been. applied in other
cases where policy considerations militate against the use of the stricter probable cause
standard. For example, in border searches, the vital national interest in preventing illegal
entries and narcotic smuggling is considered so important that the probable cause standard
should not be required. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); Rodriguez-
Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967); Alexander v. United States, 362
F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966). In searches involving industries which are closely regulated by the
government, the courts reason that businessmen enter the industry with the knowledge
that their inventory records will be subject to inspection by the government. See, e.g.,
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (retail store selling firearms was searched
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would only be required to show that he had a "reasonable suspicion"
that an offense has been or is being committed. Although the precise
definition of a "reasonable suspicion" has not been formulated, it is
generally satisfied if the searching party has a reasonable belief "that
criminal activity may be afoot."75
Courts have applied the reasonable suspicion standard in deciding
cases involving traditional searches conducted by school officials" and in
cases involving searches conducted with the use of dogs in settings
other than schools." However, it is inappropriate to draw together
these precedents in determining which standard should be applied when
a dog search is conducted in a public school. As previously discussed,
the use of dogs in the school constitutes a search under the fourth
amendment and is subject to the limits of that amendment. 8 Further-
more, even if the use of dogs is a search, the rationale offered in other
cases which have applied the less strict standard is not relevant when
dogs are used in schools because criminal evidence is not sought and
because the use of the canines creates a greater potential for the in-
fringement of privacy rights.
DOE AND OTHER SCHOOL CASES
In cases involving school searches, the more lenient standard of rea-
without the requisite showing of probable cause); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor establishment held subject to inspections without the re-
quisite showing of probable cause). In stop-and-frisk searches, the Supreme Court has
validated the often used police practice of stopping suspicious persons on the street for
questioning and occasionally searching for dangerous weapons in order to protect the public
safety. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The lesser standard is also used in ad-
ministrative searches, such as housing inspections, because the public's interest in demand-
ing enforcement of minimum city standards of health and safety outweighs the minimal in-
trusion upon the homeowner's privacy which is caused by the search. See, e.g., Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The rationale used to support application of the less
restrictive standard in administrative cases has often been used in deciding the constitu-
tionality of searches conducted in public schools. See notes 104-29 & accompanying text in-
ira.
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The amount of evidence needed to meet the
reasonable suspicion standard is unclear because the amount of evidence needed for the
higher standard is equally unclear. For an explanation of the differences between the tradi-
tional standard and the one in Terry v. Ohio, see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 9.3(b).
"' See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-
Chatham C.U.S.D. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214
(N.D. Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
See, e.g., People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973); People v.
Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 367 N.E.2d 949 (1977). Courts that determine the validity of dog
searches often do not address which standard applies because they have found that the use
of dogs does not constitute a search. Therefore, the question of reasonableness is not rele-
vant. Nevertheless, the existence of some prior suspicion has been required with respect to
the object searched. This prior suspicion is analogous to the reasonable suspicion standard
applied in the school cases.
" See notes 22-69 & accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 56:321
DRUG DETECTING DOGS
sonable suspicion has generally been applied. A balancing approach is
used, comparing the invasion of the student's rights with the school ad-
ministrator's need to protect and preserve a productive school environ-
ment." In striking this balance, courts have concentrated on weighing
the danger of the suspected conduct against the student's right to
privacy and the "need to protect them from the humiliation and psycho-
logical harms" associated with the search."
Another factor considered in the balance is the distinction between
searches conducted for school administrative purposes and those con-
ducted for law enforcement purposes. If the police conduct the search to
further their own criminal investigations, the strict standard of prob-
able cause is applied;81 but, when school officials conduct the search for
school regulatory purpose, only a reasonable suspicion is required.2 The
relationship between a school administrator and a student is different
from the relationship between a police officer and a suspected criminal.
In Moore v. Student Affairs Committee," the court stressed that the
competing interests of both the student and the school administrator
must be protected.8 Therefore, to protect both the student's right of
79 Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ind. 1979); accord, M. v. Board of Educ.
Ball-Chatham C.U.S.D. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (students' rights must be
balanced against ability of school officials to maintain order and discipline); State v. McKin-
non, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (question of reasonableness involves balancing the
governmental interests against the individual's right to be free from intrusions).
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
" See, e.g., M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham C.U.S.D. No. 5. 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D.
Ill. 1977) (the less strict standard should be used because no police were involved); Picha v.
Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-21 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (distinguishing between searches that do
and do not involve the police, noting that the strict standard of probable cause is required
when the police are involved); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 495, 216 S.E.2d 586, 593-94 (1975)
(reasonable suspicion standard will pass constitutional muster only if school officials are act-
ing in their proper capacities and the search is free of involvement by law enforcement per-
sonnel); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 116, 120, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977) (noting that high
school principal is not a law enforcement officer, and should not be held to meet the prob-
able cause standard in conducting school searches). See also People v. Bowers, 72 Misc. 2d
800, 339 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1973). In that case a search was conducted by a uniformed security
guard who was employed by the school board rather than the police department. The court
held that the guard was "cloaked with police powers" and therefore the scope of his actions
was limited by the fourth amendment. Id. at 802, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
1 See M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham C.U.S.D. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill.
1977); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 116, 120, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977).
'3 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
" Id. at 730.
The [college to student] relationship grows out of the peculiar and sometimes
the seemingly competing interests of college and student. A student naturally
has the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizures, and a tax-
supported public college may not compel a "waiver" of that right as a condi-
tion precedent to admission. The college, on the other hand, has an "affirm-
ative obligation" to promulgate and to enforce reasonable regulations designed
to protect campus order and discipline and to promote an environment consis-
tent with the educational process.
Id. at 729 (footnotes omitted).
1981]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
privacy, and the university's interest in maintaining a productive, drug-
free atmosphere in the dormitories, the court applied the reasonable
suspicion standard. 5
The distinction between these searches and those that are conducted
for law enforcement purposes was made again in Piazzola v. Watkins,88
which arose out of the same dormitory search conducted in Moore."
However, the dormitory room search in Piazzola was held to be uncon-
stitutional. The court in Piazzola distinguished the search from Moore
because it did not pertain to the "special relationship" between the
school and the student.88 The special relationship was tainted because
the police initiated the search for the sole purpose of gathering in-
criminating evidence against the defendants for use at a criminal trial.89
The interests behind the Piazzola search were not limited to those held
by the school and the student, but included those of the police authori-
ties. The court held that when a search furthers the interests of the
police, it must be subjected to the traditional strict standard of probable
cause.
90
The court in Piazzola recognized a potential infringement of students'
rights in allowing too much police participation in a search conducted
primarily by school authorities. A search conducted with extensive
police involvement furthers the interests of the police to such an extent
that it overshadows the stated school regulatory purpose behind the
search.' Piazzola and similar decisions, therefore, have attempted to
distinguish school searches involving regulatory interests from those in-
volving police interests; the latter require the application of the tradi-
tional standard of probable cause." Student searches based on less than
Id. at 730.
316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971).
Both Piazzola and Moore involved the same general dormitory search conducted by
university officials and narcotic agents. Six or seven dormitory rooms were searched dur-
ing the general inspection. The searches in Piazzola and Moore involved different rooms. In
Moore, the student whose room was searched was seeking reinstatement as a student in
good standing. 284 F. Supp. at 727. In Piazzola, two students whose rooms were searched
were seeking habeas corpus relief. 316 F. Supp. at 624-25. Judge Johnson of the Middle
District of Alabama wrote both opinions.
316 F. Supp. at 628.
89 Id. at 626-27.
SId.
9, [A] student . . . must yield [his rights] to the extent that they would inter-
fere with the institution's fundamental duty to operate the school as an educa-
tional institution. This distinction is not one of form over substance. The
distinction lies in the "special relationship" existing between the college and
the student and the purposes for which the search is conducted.
Id. at 628.
' Other school cases have also tried to make the distinction. See, e.g., Picha v. Wielgos,
410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1976): "Where the police have significant participation,
Fourth Amendment rights cannot leak out the hole of presumed consent to a search by an
ordinarily nongovernmental party." See notes 81-82 & accompanying text supra.
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probable cause are permitted in order for school officials to realize ad-
ministrative interests, such as the extirpation of marijuana use in the
school. Police interests in arresting drug users, however, do not justify
the use of the less strict standard, and any investigatory procedures used
to achieve those interests must be tested under the traditional standard
of probable cause. In making this distinction between police and admin-
istrators, these courts have denied the police officers the power to
achieve their investigative interests by conducting searches which, if
conducted outside the school environment, would be in violation of the
fourth amendment. 3 If the distinction were not made, police officers
would be able to use the school search as an investigative tool which is
not subject to the traditional limitations of the fourth amendment. They
would be obtaining evidence upon a "silver platter" -a practice long ago
invalidated by the Supreme Court. 4
Although recognizing the significance of the distinction, courts find it
very difficult to differentiate between regulatory and criminal searches
in schools. The Moore and Piazzola cases typify the problems of trying
to quantify what degree of police participation changes a regulatory
school search into a criminal school search. In searches involving dogs,
the problems are magnified to such an extent that it cannot be meaning-
fully determined whether a particular search was conducted for the pur-
pose of furthering the school's interests or those of the police depart-
ment.
Extensive police involvement is likely to be needed by school officials
in conducting a dog search. Police are often involved in school searches
when it is unlawful to possess the item sought 6 and the need for extra
manpower in dog searches will demand even greater police assist-
ance. It is also probable that the dog handlers and trainers are police
officers. Additional police officers may be needed to assist the school
,3 Outside the school, the police officers would be required to meet the standard of prob-
able cause. See note 71 & accompanying text supra.
, The "silver platter" theory was invalidated in Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310
(1927). Prior to Gambino, state officers were not subject to the limitations of the fourth
amendment and were, therefore, permitted to give evidence discovered in searches, which
would have been unconstitutional if conducted by federal officers, to federal officers to be
used in a federal prosecution.
'5 See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 284
(5th Cir. 1971); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
" See, e.g., Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (N.D. IlL. 1976) (principal called
police after he received a tip from a caller concerning two students); Mercer v. State, 450
S.W.2d 715, 721 n.3 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (principal of school met with city police depart-
ment on weekly basis).
Approximately 40 police officers took part in the dog search in Doe. Plaintiffs' Memor-
andum, supra note 15, at 8. There has not been such a degree of police involvement in
previous school cases.
" This was not necessarily true in Doe, although the occupations of the dog handlers
were not described in detail. The owner and operator of the dog academy which provided
the dogs, and coordinator of the search, was a "sworn, non-paid and non-uniformed Deputy
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authorities in identifying the various types of contraband discovered.
Despite extensive involvement by the police in Doe,99 the court held that
the dog search was solely for school administrative purposes."'0 The court
did not consider the extensive police involvement as significant because
the police agreed not to use the dogs to further their own investigative
interests, nor prosecute any student found in possession of drugs during
the search. 1 '
The existence of an agreement not to prosecute should not be dispos-
itive of whether the search should be considered to serve administrative
or criminal investigatory purposes because the mere existence of an
agreement not to prosecute does not remove the criminal stigma caused
by the search. Even if the police do not prosecute, the implicated
students may be vulnerable to future police harassment or put under
surveillance outside the school environment.' 2 Police officers could also
make threats of subsequent prosecutions in order to coerce a student to
implicate others using drugs. A dog search conducted in the presence of
police officers provides the police department with names and descrip-
tions of several likely marijuana users in the community. Access to this
Sheriff of Miami County, Indiana." 475 F. Supp. at 1017. The occupations of the handlers
ranged from "[a] housewife to deputy county sheriffs." Id. at 1017 n.7. However, the court
did not attach any significance to the fact that several dog handlers were police officers. It
held that none of those police officers were actively engaging in their occupation" while par-
ticipating in the dog search at the school.
The occupations of the dog handlers in Jones were not described. The dogs were pro-
vided by Security Associates, Inc., a private corporation. See 499 F. Supp. at 228.
" A uniformed police officer accompanied each of the six canine teams, which consisted
of a school administrator or teacher, the dog and its handler. Uniformed police officers also
were present in the hallways of the school throughout the investigation. About 40 officers
took part in the search. 475 F. Supp. at 1016.
10 Because those [school] administrators now acted with assistance from a uni-
formed officer does not change their function. The officers were merely aiding
in the inspection, at the request of the school administrators. Their presence
does not change the actions of the school official[s] from that of supervision ...
to that of an unwarranted search.
Id. at 1020.
Ill The validity of the actual agreement between the police and school administrators is
questionable. Technically, only the county prosecutor can guarantee immunity from pros-
ecution. Mays, Who Says Students Have Rights?, STUDENT LAW., February, 1980, at 17. No
prosecutions arose from the search in Doe, but it is possible ,that in future cases that in-
volve such an agreement, the police officers may feel obligated to bring charges where
much more marijuana is discovered than expected, thus implicating the student as a dealer.
102 See Rotenberg & Sayer, Marijuana in Houston High Schools-A First Report, 6
Hous. L. REV. 759, 778 (1969). The Houston police department often stopped an automobile
filled with teenagers, using as a pretext some minor traffic violation. "The minor traffic ar-
rest is subject to obvious abuse by the police: a stretching of the facts so as to-legitimate a
search; and harassment of law abiding citizens." Id. Such action could be directed at
students implicated or found in possession of marijuana at school.
Another practice was the use of parents to "spy" on their own children. Id. at 779. In
Doe, therefore, although the police agreed not prosecute, the use of the dogs can be an im-
portant starting point in a major drug abuse investigation.
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type of information would be much more difficult to acquire if the police
were subject to the strict standard of-probable cause under which they
normally must operate. However, when dogs are used in an indiscrimi-
nate manner under the guise of a school regulatory search, the police
are able to obtain incriminating evidence easily and efficiently at the ex-
pense of the students' fourth amendment rights."°3
Administrative Search Theory and School Searches
Even if school officials are able to conduct the dog 'search without the
assistance of the police, the increased invasion of students' privacy and
the greater potential for unwarranted injury to their reputations are ad-
ditional factors that distinguish a school dog search from other school
searches. Although most lower courts which have dealt with school
searches have only treated these factors in a cursory manner, the
Supreme Court has addressed similar factors outside the school context.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,"' the Supreme Court held that a city
housing official must secure a search warrant before making a residen-
tial housing inspection for administrative code violations.' However,
the Court stated that the warrant may be obtained upon a showing of a
quantum of evidence that is less than that required to meet the tradi-
tional standard of probable cause."' The rationale behind the Court's ap-
plication of the more lenient standard is that an administrative inspec-
tion of a residence is unlike an indiscriminate search through a citizen's
personal belongings looking for incriminating evidence. Therefore, the
tests in determining the validity of these searches should be more per-
missive."' The Supreme Court's justification for using the lesser stand-
ard in Camara was that the governmental interest in enforcing occu-
pancy violations is more deserving of protection than the minimally
affected fourth amendment rights of the homeowner."' This justifies a
balancing approach, weighing the "need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.""' 9 Several courts, noting the similarities be-
tween administrative searches and school searches, have followed
Camara and have utilized a balancing approach in determining the
validity of searches conducted in the school environment."'
I" It seems intuitively clear that it would be more expensive and involve a greater
number of man hours to conduct the major type of investigation needed to acquire the
amount and type of information discovered in Doe.
1 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (decided in con-
junction with Camara; dealt with the issue of inspection of business premises).
"4 387 U.S. at 534.
"' Id. at 534-35, 538.
Id. at 535.
"4 Id. at 537-39.
Id. at 537.
"to See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 490, 216 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1975); State v. McKin-
non, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 78-79, 558 P.2d 781, 783 (1977). See also Buss, supra note 22, at 753-60.
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The Degree of Intrusion Factor
A significant factor in the balancing approach used in Camara and in
prior school cases has been the degree of intrusion created by the
search."' The Supreme Court in Camara considered the housing inspec-
tion to be much less intrusive than the typical search in the criminal
procedure context because the former is "neither personal in nature nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime."". Typical housing inspec-
tions involve an examination of plumbing, heating or electrical systems
and do not require rummaging through a homeowner's personal effects
and papers. They are generally conducted during the day and in a non-
coercive, business-like manner and are, therefore, less likely to arouse
the suspicions of neighbors or friends.
Similarly, the conventional searches conducted by school officials in a
public school environment, although personal in nature, are often less
intrusive than those conducted by law enforcement officers upon sus-
pected criminals. The school searches are generally conducted in the
privacy of the principal's office, and the students are often summoned to
the office in a neutral manner, so that the purpose is not apparent to
other students."
However, the use of dogs in school searches departs from the less
coercive atmosphere of Camara and the usual school cases. In Doe v.
Renfrow,"4 unlike Jones v. Latexo Independent School District,"'
uniformed police officers led dogs around the school halls and through
each classroom, indiscriminately sniffing each student."6 A positive
reaction"" by a dog implicated a student not in the privacy of a prin-
... See, e.g., 387 U.S. at 537; note 113 & accompanying text infra.387 U.S. at 537.
1 See M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham C.U.S.D. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill. 1977)
(students were taken from study hall class to a nearby kitchen area); In re G.C., 121 N.J.
Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (1972) (student searched in principal's office); People v. Scott D., 34
N.Y.S.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974) (same); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.
2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (student searched in vice-principal's office); cf. State v. Baccino,
282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971) ("tug of war" over the student's jacket ensued in school
hallway between the student and a vice-principal); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319
N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971) (coordinator of discipline was forced to pursue the defendant three
blocks away from the school, after the defendant ran from the school building).
... 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
' 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
16 Id. at 228; 475 F. Supp. at 1016-17.
The presence of the dogs may be frightening to some of the more sensitive children. A
positive reaction is likely to frighten anyone. Each dog reacts differently, but they gener-
ally snarl, bark, whine or paw at the area of the scent. Comment, United States v. Solis:
Have Government's Suppersniffers Come down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Con-
gestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410, 415 (1976). However, in one case the dog reacted "by
growling, barking, biting.., and scratching" at the area of the scent. People v. Evans, 65
Cal. App. 3d 924, 929, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436, 442 (1977); cf. Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 233 (evidence
indicated that the dog "slobbered" on one child in the course of the search and had
previously been trained as an attack dog).
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cipal's office, but in front of his peers. The student would then be re-
quired to empty his pockets in the presence of his classmates."' Thus,
the dog search is more "stigmatizing" in that it singles out a particular
student as the object of official suspicion.'
The dog search not only tends to stigmatize the student violators, but
also has the potential to do the same to innocent students. In Doe, the
dogs alerted to fifty different students, yet only seventeen were found
to possess marijuana."' Although the other thirty-three students ap-
parently did not possessdrugs,"' they were subjected to an unpleasant
experience which was damaging to their reputations in the school and in
the community. 22
The Lack of Alternatives Factor
In addition to the less intrusive nature of an administrative search,
the Court in Camara noted that housing authorities must be permitted
to make residential inspections upon the less strict standard because
application of the higher standard would place an unreasonable burden
upon the ability of city agencies to maintain minimal standards of
health, occupancy and fire prevention." The Court stated that there
were no other techniques available which were able to "achieve accept-
able results" in enforcing housing regulations.' 4 The rationale behind
this factor is that in certain exigent circumstances an infringement of a
person's rights should be permitted, but only when the least intrusive
method is utilized. In light of this consideration set forth in Camara,
decisions involving school searches have justified an infringement upon
students' rights because the infringement is inevitable in order to com-
bat the drug abuse problem."'
,,. Doe, 475 F. Supp. at 1022.
119 Cf. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 10.11(b), at 462 (school searches less stigmatizing
than criminal searches because usually conducted in principal's office).
'" 475 F. Supp. at 1017. In addition two students were found in possession of drug
paraphernalia.
,2 Although the dogs alerted to some students who did not have marijuana on them, the
dogs may have been picking up a "dead scent." See notes 138-41 & accompanying text infra.
'" The potential danger to a student's reputation was addressed in Merriken v.
Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The court held that a drug control program
designed to identify potential drug abusers in a junior high school was unconstitutional in
that it invaded the children's right of privacy. One reason was that a reputation as a drug
abuser can be very harmful to the child. The court stated: "'[There are nany opportunities
for a child to suffer insurmountable harm from a labeling such as 'drug abuser' at an age
when the cruelty of other children is at an extreme." Id. at 920.
" 387 U.S. at 523.
" Id. at 537. "There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field
that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards re-
quired by~municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures." Id. at
535-36 (footnote omitted).
i' See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975) (school officials should be
allowed to make immediate, effective searches to prevent disturbances); People v. D., 34
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It is unlikely that an indiscriminate use of marijuana detecting dogs is
the only technique available which would achieve acceptable results in
combating the drug problem. 126 It is also unlikely that the use of dogs is
as effective as conventional methods to control a school's drug
problem." The use of marijuana detecting dogs will not control the
overall drug problem if the dogs are unable to detect the presence of
other often used drugs, such as alcohol and amphetamines.'" The use of
dogs may deter students from bringing marijuana into the school build-
ing, but will do very little to deter student use of the drug in the
schoolyard or away from school. Also, the use of dogs may implicate
those students who merely are experimenting with the drug while
allowing more sophisticated student drug dealers, who do not store the
contraband in their lockers, to go unsuspected. The use of dogs to detect
marijuana will at best provide a short-term solution; it will not ap-
preciably lessen the underlying problems of student ignorance about
drugs, and peer pressure to use drugs, nor will it eliminate sources of
drugs in the community.
Despite its approval of the less strict standard in upholding adminis-
trative searches, the Camara decision sought to preserve a citizen's
rights by allowing a minimal invasion of his privacy only as a last resort.
A dog search in a public school cannot be rationalized under Camara
because it is more intrusive than the typical principal-student confronta-
tion" and because the use of dogs is not essential in conducting an effec-
tive school drug abuse program.
The extensive involvement of the police and the intrusive nature of
the dog search creates a situation different from those addressed by
other courts deciding on the validity of school searches. The rationale
N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974) (held search unconstitutional, suggest-
ing alternative: school should put suspected student under closer surveillance for a couple
of days before search); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971) (noting
that rigid standard of probable cause should not be imposed on school official expected to
effectively supervise students); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977)
(maintaining school discipline often requires immediate search without procurement of
search warrant based on probable cause).
Professor LaFave argues otherwise that the traditional probable cause standard can be
just as successful in achieving acceptable results as the more lenient reasonable suspicion
standard. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 10.11(b).
See Camara, 387 U.S. at 523.
12 There was no showing in Doe that the indiscriminate use of marijuana detecting dogs
was the only means adequate to combat the drug problem. There were reported instances
of drug use and possession prior to the search. Thus, school officials must have used some
type of procedure to detect the use of drugs in the school. The court did not state why the
current procedure was inadequate nor why other programs were not considered. 475 F.
Supp. at 1015-16.
" Dogs may be trained to detect odors of drugs other than marijuana. See Savage, supra
note 62, at 47. There was no indication in Doe that any of the dogs were certified to detect
any drug other than marijuana.
11 See notes 113-22 & accompanying text supra.
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behind these more conventional school cases is that there is a special
relationship between the student and the school administrator because
each has valid interests that must be recognized by the courts. Thus,
courts have attempted to formulate a standard that protects students
from intrusive and unwarranted searches, but which does not place an
impossible burden upon the duty of the school administrator to maintain
a productive and drug-free high school environment. In contrast, when
trained dogs are utilized, the special relationship between the student
and the school breaks down because the interests of the student are
given only minimal attention. Although the dog search may be con-
ducted primarily by school officials and despite the existence of an
agreement not to prosecute, the harmful effects which accompany a
criminal search are still present. The dog search is indiscriminate and
potentially stigmatizing for both innocent and guilty students. Uphold-
ing dog searches based upon only a reasonable suspicion endorses a very
intrusive dragnet despite the absence of any proof that the use of dogs is
essential in combating the drug problem in high schools.
DOE AND OTHER DOG SEARCH CASES
The few courts that have considered the utilization of dogs to be a
search, have upheld the utilization upon the less strict standard of
reasonable suspicion.'30 Other courts, even though they have refused to
label the use of dogs a "search," have required the showing of some
evidence of prior suspicion.'3'
The rationale in applying the less strict standard in these cases is
that the use of dogs is a reliable yet fairly unintrusive means to search
for illegal drugs.'32 Implicit in this rationale is a judicial reluctance to
preclude the employment of a highly effective and "useful law enforce-
ment tool."' 3 These courts do not want the rigid standard of probable
,0 See cases cited note 66 supra.
See, e.g., People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 457, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366, 367-68 (1973)
(dog's positive reactions corroborated an informant's tip); People v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308,
317, 367 N.E.2d 949, 954 (1977) (use of trained dogs to corroborate information already
received acceptable under the fourth amendment).
13 See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 317, 367 N.E.2d 949, 953 (1977): "[Tlhe use
of trained dogs to detect the odor of marijuana poses no threat of harassment, intimidation
or even inconvenience to the innocent citizen."
' United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976). In State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio
App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976), the court considered the options a police officer has to
follow up an unspecified tip:
Obviously, merely searching the package or breaking into the trailer is pro-
hibited .... Conceivably, had the trained police dog not been available, the
police could have staked out the area, or followed the package in transit, utiliz-
ing perhaps hundreds of hours of police work in an effort to obtain further
evidence necessary to sustain the issuance of a search or arrest warrant. In-
stead, the police ... utilized the trained police dog to obtain the further
evidence necessary for procurement of a search warrant.
Id. at 311-12, 354 N.E.2d at 718.
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cause to hamper unduly the use of a law enforcement technique whicl is
less intrusive than a normal search. 13' The standard used in determining
the validity of searches should be flexible; it should be less strict for
less intrusive searches. These courts imply that if held to the standard
of probable cause, law enforcement officials would be unable to control
effectively the smuggling of drugs. Therefore, these officials should be
entitled to use a technique which is less intrusive and which is effective
in controlling the illegal transportation of drugs.
This argument cannot be made in the school situation, in which admin-
istrators are not hampered by the inflexible nature of the probable
cause standard and dog searches are more intrusive than conventional
school searches. School administrators already exercise wide discretion
in conducting student searches.1 3' Therefore, they, unlike law enforce-
ment officials, are not entitled to more power and latitude in enforcing
drug regulations.
Past cases involving dogs have often considered the dog's effective-
ness and reliability in discovering hidden drugs as a significant factor in
allowing their use.' 6 However, the accuracy of the canines in Doe was
far from perfect.' 3' The discrepancy arises because sometimes the dog
11 This view is similar to the position taken by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), which held that a stop-and-frisk search was constitutional even though the
police officer failed to show that he had probable cause to search. The Court noted that the
stop-and-frisk search was less intrusive than a normal search and therefore should not be
tested under the same standard. Id. at 29-30.
"1 School administrators currently possess more latitude than police officers in conduct-
ing school searches. See notes 79-103 & accompanying text supra. To allow school adminis-
trators the use of trained dogs would give them even wider discretion. In the criminal con-
text it is clear that police officers would not be allowed to "roam the streets at will with
trained dogs or sensor instruments, detecting the odor of marijuana and arresting persons
at will as a result." State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 313, 354 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1976).
However, such unchecked power would be a reality in the school context if dogs were per-
mitted to be used in an indiscriminate manner as they were in Doe and Jones.
'" This point was used in United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976), to distinguish the use of dogs from the use of magnetometers.
The court said that the magnetometer search was indiscriminate and that the presence of a
sufficient amount of metal would lead to a body or baggage search. On the other hand, the
court noted that the trained dogs only detect marijuana, possession of which is a criminal
offense. 521 F.2d at 462-63.
The ability of dogs to detect the scent of marijuana is generally unquestionable if trained
properly; their sense of smell is eight times greater than a human's. Dogs have been trained
to sense the presence of heroin, which emits such a faint odor that it is considered by some
authorities to have no scent at all. See Savage, supra note 62, at 47-48. The reliability of a
trained dog should not be tested upon how many times he picks up a scent and how many
times he fails, but should depend upon how many times he picks up a scent when the drug
is not actually present.
'3 The dogs alerted to 50 different students, yet only 17 were found to be in possession
of marijuana. 475 F. Supp. at 1017. The mistakes did not favor the suspect. This was con-
sidered important in upholding a dog search in United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976). In explaining this factor the court in Bronstein
stated that when the dogs err they do so to the extent that they fail to pick up the scent.
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reacts to a "dead scent," which lingers in the air after the marijuana has
been removed. '38 The frequency of these "false alerts" is unknown, but
several reasons have been given, including ineffective communication
between the handler and his dog,139 the dog's short attention span" and
the effect upon the dog created by various working conditions."'
In the prior dog cases, the canines were utilized for a few minutes.'
In Doe, they were utilized for two and a half hours.14 Thus, the strain
upon the dog's attention span, which may not have been relevant in
other cases, is a factor that should be considered before sustaining ex-
tensive dog searches under the reasonable suspicion standard. If courts
require school officials to have probable cause before they utilize the
dogs, the attention span of the dogs will not be such an important factor
because the search necessarily will be limited to a specific area.'
A further distinction between the use of dogs in a school environment
and the use of dogs outside the school as part of a criminal investigation
When such a mistake occurs, the suspect is not required to open his bags and he is permit-
ted to go on his way unobstructed. 521 F.2d at 463. The court did not address the issue of
"false alerts."
" See Lederer & Lederer, Admissibility of Evidence Found by Marijuana Detection
Dogs, ARMY LAw., Apr., 1973, at 12.
" See Savage, supra note 62, at 47. Communication is so important that, in the military,
the personalities of man and dog are laboriously matched for 13 weeks. The handler must
be highly perceptive of the dog's movements because even a slight hesitation of the dog
may be an indication of a drug find. It is possible that an unqualified or inexperienced hand-
ler may unintentionally or otherwise cue his dog to give an alert. Id. See also Lederer &
Lederer, supra note 138, at 15.
The dog handlers in Doe, although certified, were not gainfully employed as dog handlers
and their previous experience with the dogs that they led around was not described by the
court. Apparently, however, the dogs were owned by their handlers. See 475 F. Supp. at
1017. In Jones, the dog handler had completed a four week training program in drug detec-
tion and had approximately one year of experience handling marijuana detecting dogs. 499
F. Supp. at 229 n.3.
". Lederer & Lederer, supra note 138, at 15.
141 Id.
"' In addition, the dogs were used to detect marijuana in one specific area, such as a
package or a piece of luggage. E.g., United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In
a few cases, the dogs were used in an airline baggage room where the dogs discovered
marijuana among numerous pieces of luggage. E.g., People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346,
124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975); People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973).
The most extensive use of a dog was in an airport warehouse where the dog detected the
scent of marijuana in two of 300 crates. See United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1976).
" 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
"' For a discussion of how specific police officers or magistrates must be in finding prob-
able cause, see 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 66, § 3.2(e). In the context of the school, the prob-
able cause requirement may make the use of dogs unnecessary, especially when searches of
students and their lockers are involved. There may be some limited situations, however,
where the dogs may be useful. See note 10 supra. In these limited situations, the probable
cause requirement will force school officials or police officers to limit the search to a partic-
ular area as to which probable cause can be articulated. When dogs are used in this more
discriminating manner false alerts due to their short attention span are less likely.
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is that in the latter situation the amount of marijuana discovered is usu-
ally large and concentrated in one area;45 accordingly, the strength of a
dog's alert is likely to be greater.4 ' When a dog reacts strongly to a
scent, it is probably reacting to the actual presence of marijuana rather
than to a dead scent.'47 However, when the amount is small and not con-
centrated, as in the school environment, 8 the dog handler may be
unable to determine whether his dog's weak alert is in response to a
dead scent or to the actual presence of a small amount of marijuana.'
Furthermore, the question of canine reliability is more crucial in
situations like Doe and Jones where the trained dogs searched individ-
ual students rather than objects or personal belongings. Decisions that
have upheld prior dog searches have been justified on the ground that
the search was less intrusive because it was not conducted upon individ-
uals.5" False alerts in these prior cases, in addition to being less prob-
able, would also consist only of a search through a person's baggage or
some other personal belonging. However, false alerts in the school situa- I
tion will lead to pat-down or strip searches,'5' which are clearly more in-
' See United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (one ton of marijuana in the
floor of a semi-trailer); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975) (60 pounds of
marijuana in each of four pieces of luggage), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); People v. Fur-
man, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973) (46 marijuana kilo bricks in two suit-
cases); State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976) (21 kilos of marijuana in a
parcel package).
", Although the relationship does not appear to be documented, there is evidence that
dogs react in different degrees according to the strength of the scent. A few cases have
mentioned various degrees of dog reactions. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880,
881 (9th Cir. 1976) (dog alerting 25 yards from the source of the scent was a strong indica-
tion of the presence of marijuana); United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1976) (dog
gave strong alert to hidden marijuana).
", See notes 138-41 & accompanying text supra.
14 In the school, the marijuana is likely to be hidden in clothing, books and purses.
Therefore, the amount hidden is likely to be very small. See Doe, 475 F. Supp. at 1012.
"' The handler must be able to read the reactions of the dog to determine whether the
dog is reacting to a dead scent or whether marijuana is actually present. See Comment,
supra note 117, at 417.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 918 (1976). The court distinguished the use of dogs and the use of a magnetometer,
claiming that the use of dogs is less intrusive because it is "aimed not at the person but his
baggage which leaked the telltale aroma." 521 F.2d at 463. See also United States v. Solis,
536 F.2d 880, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1976).
Dogs have searched pieces of luggage or baggage, e.g., United States v. Bronstein, 521
F.2d at 459; People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973); People v.
Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 367 N.E.2d 949 (1977), freight packaging, e.g., United States v.
Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976); State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976),
storage facilities, e.g., United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977); People v.
Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977), and a trunk of an automobile, e.g.,
State v. Martinez, 26 Ariz. App. 210, 547 P.2d 62 (1976).
Individuals are checked by trained dogs during border searches however. See Comment,
supra note 117, at 416 n.31. The validity of border searches is well-established. See note 74
supra.
"' See, e.g., Doe, 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
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trusive than any search could have been in the-other cases involving dogs.
A further distinction between a dog search in a school environment
and one that is conducted outside the school environmnet is that the
dog's positive reaction provides the basis of proof for securing a search
warrant. '52 The evidence of the dog's alert could be taken to a mag-
istrate who, if assured of the dog's reliability and past training, would
issue a search warrant for a more extensive examination of the
suspect's luggage or other belonging. The requirement of a search war-
rant before an extensive search is conducted provides a final check
against searches conducted with inadequately trained dogs or handlers
and searches conducted in conditions which lead to an increased poten-
tial for false alerts." Since students are not afforded the protection of
this check mechanism, '- preservation of their privacy rights depends
solely on school administrators' judgment in choosing well trained dogs
and competent handlers. However, students could be protected from un-
warranted intrusion due to false alerts if the probable cause standard is
met before the dogs are used. In order to satisfy the strict standard,
school administrators should be required to specify the room, locker or
student to be searched. The dogs will be searching for an isolated scent
and thus only be required to search for a minimal length of time. The
use of dogs, in effect, will be limited to situations in which the dog's
working conditions are ideal for detecting the scent of marijuana.
By requiring the strict standard of probable cause to be met, courts may
render the use of dogs unnecessary in most situations. When the school
official has probable cause to search, he does not need the trained dogs;
he can conduct an extensive search by himself. The dogs would only be
allowed to serve as a tool for school officials to use in conducting a
search they themselves are legally able to conduct. Such a consequence
is not crucial in the school situation where school officials already have
"I, See, e.g., United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 1977) (affidavit that
the dog was trained and certified was legally sufficient to justify the issuance of a search
warrant on the basis of the dog's alert); United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976) (is-
suance of warrant held valid on grounds that government laid strong foundation of canine
reliability and handler expertise); cf. People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr.
366 (1973) (no warrant issued, but the dog's reaction, supported by a foundation of reliabil-
ity, coupled with an informant's tip provided the probable cause for an immediate warrant-
less search). See also United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1976).
See notes 136-49 & accompanying text supra.
' The rationale behind the school cases is that the issuance of a warrant in the high
schools would tend to incorporate the full panoply of criminal procedures into the school
system, thereby having a disruptive effect upon the educational process or causing the stu-
dent psychological trauma. See In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1197, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363
(1970). Most courts have presumed without much explanation that a warrant is not re-
quired. Warrants have been required in some college dormitory room searches. See, e.g.,
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975). See also Buss, supra note 22, at
773-76.
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wide latitude under the fourth amendment in searching students. The
crucial aspect behind the application of the strict standard in school dog
searches is that the standard lessens the potential for false alerts caused
by deficient dogs or unqualified handlers.55 It protects those students
who are not in possession of marijuana yet use it outside of school or
associate with those who do.
CONCLUSION
Using dogs to detect marijuana is a search under the fourth amend-
ment and students subjected to the search are entitled to the amend-
ment's protections. In determining whether to apply the reasonable
suspicion or the probable cause standard in testing the validity of dog
searches in public schools, courts must recognize that other cases in-
volving schools or dogs are not adequate to protect the fourth amend-
ment rights of students. Unlike other school searches, the dog search in-
volves extensive police participation which makes it impossible to
distinguish the school's administrative purposes from the police depart-
ment's law enforcement purposes. The dog search is also more intrusive
than school searches not involving dogs because the dog search is more
stigmatizing and therefore damaging to the student's reputation. The
accuracy of the dogs in detecting the presence of marijuana, although
very high in criminal cases, is likely to be low in the school environment
where the scent of marijuana is widespread. Therefore the trained drug
detecting dogs, despite being useful in the criminal context, should be
prohibited from the school grounds except within the strict limitations
of the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement.
- ANTHONY P. GILLMAN
15 See notes 136-49 & accompanying text supra.
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